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UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND ClItCUIT COURTS.'
SUPREME COURT OF INI)IANA. 2
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARTLAND "
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.'
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.6
ACTION.
MT'len Money votntarib paid cannot be recoverd.-During the period
from July 1864, to March 1871, the P. Coal Co., paid to the C. and
P.It It . Co., a large sum of money as freight for transporting coal.
Afterwards the Coal Co. sued the I. R. Co., in indebitatus assumpsit to
recover back a portion of this freight, on the ground that the rate of
freight charged the Coal Co. was illegal, in that it exceeded the rates paid
by other shippers. 1el, That the money having been voluntarily paid
under no mistake of facts, and there being no circumstances of duress,
fraud or extortion, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover: Potomac
(bal Co. v. C. & P. Railroad Cb., 38 Md.
AGENT.
General and Special Agents.-A general agent is one who is author-
ized to transact all the business of his principal, or all his business of
some pirticular kind, or at some particular place: Cruzan v. Smith et al,
41 Ind.
The principal is bound by the acts of a general agent, if the latter
acted within the usual and ordinary scope of the business in which he
was employed, notwithstanding he may have violated the private instruc-
tions which the principal may have given hiiin; provided the person
dealing with such agent was ignorant of such violation and of the fact
that the agent exceeded his authority: Id.
The fact that the authority of an agent is limited to a particular busi-
ness, does not make his agency special ; it may be general in regard to
that business, as though its range was unlimited : d.
A special agent is one who is authorized to do one or more specified
acts, in pursuance of particular instructions, or within restrictions neces-
sarily implied from the act to be done: 11.
The principal is not bound by the acts of a special agent, if he ex-
ceeds the limits of his authority. And it is the duty of every person
who deals with a special agent to ascertain the extent of the agent's
authority, before dealing with him. If this be neglected, such person
will deal at his peril, and the principal will not be bound by an net
which exceeds the particular authority given : Id.
I From J. II. Bissell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 3 of his Reports.
2 From .1. B. Smith, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 41 Ind. leports.
9 From J. Shaaf Stoekett, E q., Reporter; to appear in 38 MI. Reports.
From C. E. Green, Esq., to appear in Vol. 9 of his Reports.
5 From Ron. 0. L. Barbour, to appear in Vol. 65 of his Reports.
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If a principal puts his agent in a condition to impose upon innocent
third persons by apparently pursuing his authority, the principal will be
bound by his acts, and lie must lose in prefbrence to such third persons:
1l1.
If one who is the general agent of another in the purchase of wheat,
as such agent, buys wheat to be paid for on demand at the current price
.it the time of demand, his principal will be liable, though the principal
tiay have instructed his agent to buy only for cash, and though the
principal may have paid the agent for the wheat, if the contract be made
in good fith, upon the credit of the principal, and without any know-
ledge of the private instructions of the principal : Id.
ATTORNEY. See Sherff.
Suspension of-Partnership of.-The provisions of the statute for the
suspension of an attorney from practice are penal in their nature, and
should be strictly construed : Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind.
An attorney cannot be suspended firom practice by the default of
his partner in collecting and converting the money of a client without
his knowledge or consent : Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Rigid of the Assignee to sue in any District Court-A. suit may be
maintained by an assignee in bankruptcy to collect the assets of the
bankrupt in any other District Court than that where the proceedings
in bankruptcy are pending.: Goodall, Assignee, etc., v. gTuttle, D. C.
West. Dist. Wis., 3 Bissell.
The right of the assignee to sue in the other District Courts is not
expressly conferred, but it may be held to be included in and implied
from the grant "to collect the assets," as that power could not be other-
wise made effectual : Id.
Jurisdiction over debtors of the bankrupt not being obtained by the
bankruptcy proceedings, such power must, in' order to give full effect
thereto, necessarily be held to extend to any district where a suit to
collect the assets is necessary: Id.
It must be held that Congress intended to provide for the complete
administration of the bankruptcy system in tle Federal courts, and as
authority to entertain such suits is not given to the Circuit Courts, it
must exist in the District Courts, or the jurisdiction be radically defect-
ive : Id.
The second section relates exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Cir-
cuit Courts under the act, and its provisions cannot, therefore, properly
be referred to, to limit the jurisdiction of the District Court confierred
by the first section : Id.
The rule that a legislature, by adopting a statute of another state, or
re-enacting an old statute, is presumed to have adopted the judicial
construction given thereto, considered, and authorities referred to. Cases
under the Bankrupt Act of 1841 cited and approved : Rd.
Congress not possessing the power to require or compel the state tri-
bunals to entertain suits in favor of an assignee for the collection of the
assets of the bankrupt, the courts should not construe the Bankrupt
Act in such a manner as to necessitate in its execution assistance be-
yobd the constitutional power of 'Congress to provide : d.
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Transfer of Promissory hrotes.-The transfer of promissory notes by
the payce during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings against him
upon which he was afterwards adjudged a bankrupt, and of an injunc-
tion restraining him from disposing of his property, vests no title in the
purchaser, even though lie had no actual notice of the bankruptcy
proceedings: it re Lake, D. C. North. Dist. Ill.. 3 Bissell.
All the world is bound to take notice of proceedings in bankruptcy,
and the purchaser takes with constructive notice : 11.
Pifty per cent. Clause.-Since the amendment of July 27th 1868, a
bankrupt is entitled to his discharge, without the assent of his creditors,
if his gross assets equal 50 per cent. of the debts proved, without de-
ducting costs or expenses : In re Kahley, D. C. West. Dist. Wis., 3 Bis.
sell.
The intention of Congress in making this amendment clearly was to
make the term assets as comprehensive as tstate, and relieve the debtor
from the costs and expenses of the proceedings.
Insurance Company-Aplpointment of Receiver-Act of Bankriptce
-Statc Proceedings vo objection to Jurisdiction.-A fire insurance
company is clearly within the scope and provisions of the bankrupt law:
In re T1 he MAerchants Insurance Co., D. C., North. Dist. Ill., 3 Bissell.
The appointment by a state court of a receiver to take possession of
the property and assets of the corporation is "a taking on legal process"
within the meaning of the thirty-ninth section of the bankrupt act: L.
Though the proceedings in the state court may have been within its
powers and jurisdiction, yet when the fact of bankruptcy intervenes the
exclusive jurisdiction of this court attaches : l.
When the corporation found itself insolvent, it should have at once
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and failure so to do, and acqui-
escence in the proceedings against it by the state court, is itself an act
of bankruptcy: Id.
The payment by the corporatiob, when actually insolvent, of the rent
necessary to preserve a valuable lease, is an act of bankruptcy; and
although such payment was judicious and made in good faith, and such
an act as would have been authorized by this court, these facts do not
change the character of the act under the law: Id.
Cuvcnant to iTsur.-A covenant in a mortgage to keep the mortgaged
premises insured for the benefit of the mortgagee creates a specific
equitable lien upon the insurance money, which is valid as against an
assignee in bankruptcy: In, re The Sands Ale Brewing Conipany, D.
C., North. Dist. Ill., 3 Bissell.
The mortgage being recorded, the covenant acts upon the insurance
as soon as effected, runs with the land, and is notice to creditors ; and
no subsequent assignment can affect the rights of the mortgagee. It is
nt necessary that the policies be specifically assigned, nor that the
mortgagee select the companies. And any acts of the mortgagor with-
olit the csc ,t of the mortgagee will not defeat the effect of the cove-
nlant l(1.
ltonvisiea' -An insolvent merchant, having sold his homestead for
vash, cannot. by moving his family into his store, hold that as his home-
.t .a I. v zenmt : In re lWriyht, D. C., East. Dist. Wis., 3 Bissell.
VOL. XXII.-13
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Though his right to sell his homestead is undoubted, he cannot shift
it, to the prejudice of his creditors : I.
in such case the court will order a delivery of possession to the as-
signee : Id.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Bankruptcy.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
By corporation-.Acts of President and Secretary- Ultra 1-'s-
kInnction.-Where under a contract with a corporation, chattels nre
furnished, and the corporation gives a mortgage upon the chattels, to
secure the debt, in pretended compliance with the agreement, and the
mortgagees suppose it was in actual and full compliance with it, a court
of equity will not enjoin the mortgagees who have been put in rightful
possession of the chattels under the mortgage from selling them, at the
instance of a were stockholder seeking to deprive the unortgnqgees of a
lieni to which they are equitably entitled as against him, oi tie grounid
that the corporation in executing the mortgage, acted ulira rircs
Amerman v. Wiles and others, 9 0. E. Green.
Tihe execution of a chattel mortgage by the president and secretary
of a corporation, who were at the time owners of two-thirds of its
stock, and its subsequent filing in the clerk's office of the proper county,
is a substantial compliance with a statute requiring in order to the val-
idity of a mortgage by a corporation, that the written assent of the
stockholders owning at least two-thirds of the capital stock of such cor-
poration, should be first filed in the office of the clerk of the county
where the mortgaged premises are situated : Id.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See Debtor aad (,'reditor.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Confessons-Onus.-If the confession of the prisoner has been in-
duced by any threat of harm, or promise of worldly advantage held
out to him by the witness, or by his authority, or in his presence and
with his sanction, it is inadmissible : .Nicholson v. State, 38 Md.
Where the confession of a prisoner is offered in evidence, the onus is
upon the prosecutor to show affirmatively that it was not made in conse-
quence of an improper inducement, or was not obtained from the pri-
soner by improper means. Id.
When the confession of a prisoner on trial is offered against him, its
admissibility in evidence must be determined by the Court and not by
the jury: d.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Surety.
Drafts of a third person-Collaterals.-When drafts of a third per-
son or company received by a creditor, are not taken as payment, but
simply to apply in payment of the debt, when collected, they can have
no effect on the creditor's rights, so long as they remain unpaid, except
to suspend his remedy until they become due: Allen v. Clark et. al.,
65 Barb.
They are to be deemed as taken simply as collateral ; and the creditor
has the right to prosecute them to judgment and execution without
prejudice to his right afterwards to proceed against the principal debtor,
so long as he faiils to secure satisfaction : Ml.
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EQuIrY. See ('/ittl rtgage; NAasaice; Partition; Tresass.
EXECUTION.
,Sale- C9m.table.-Personal property must be present and subject to
the view of those attending a constable's sale. And the sale, in good
ftith, by a constable, of a hog, in a pen from one to two hundred rods
from tie place of sale, and entirely out of sight, is unauthorized : Gas-
kill v. Aldrich, 41 Ind.
FRAUD. See Limitations.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Agreement to Pay for Ser&ea with Land.-Although an agreement,
by parol, to pay for services in land is void, and the person rendering
the services may sue for and recover what such services are reasonably
worth, yet this general rule is not without qualifications and exceptions:
anqhl, ll v. Campbell, 65 Barb.
The a:.greiennt is not corrupt, and therefore void. It is void only as
to the land. That part of the agreement cannot be enforced; and
hence, services which were rendered with a view to compensation would
be left uneoompensated, unless the law implied an agreement to pay fbr
them what they were reasonably worth : Id.
When the contract is to pay in land for services, the party agreeing
to convey mnut either have put it out of his power to do so. or refused
to convey oin tender to him of a deed : P.
HOMESTEAD. See Bankmiqtcy.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Separate Estate of a Mfarried oman-Under Art. 45, sec. 2, of
tie Code, a married woman owning a separate real estate, may charge
the same with the payment of a debt contracted by herself and hus-
band, by their promissory note, in which they jointly and severally
bind themselves, their separate and individual estates; and the only
way to enforce the contract on the part of the wife, is to treat it as
constituting an equitable lien or charge upon her separate estate, and
upon failure to pay the debt, to decree the sale of the land for its satis-
fhction: 17l & ifume v. Eccleston, 38 Md.
A contract fbunded upon proper consideration, by which the husband
and wife bind themselves to execute a mortgage of the separate estate
of the wife, will be enforced by a Court of Equity, and such estate
held liable for the debt intended to be secured: Ird.
'fhe separate estate of a married woman is liable in equity for all the
debts, incumbrances, or other engagements which she, together with
her husband, may by express terms, or clear implication, charge
thereon : 1(1.
INJUNCTION. See Chattel Mortgage; Nuisance; Trespass.
LI'MITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Tr pass.
Fraud- onraee/ance treated as Hortag.-Complaint against an ad-
ministrator, alleging that a deed of conveyance of land to his decedent,
absolute ou its tae, was a m')rtgage; that the decedent, as the attorney
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of the plaintiff, was guilty of gross fraud and violation of duty in pro-
curing his client, the plaintiff, to execute a deed instead of a mortgage
to secure liabilities incurred by the attorney in becoming bail for him,
and for fees due the attorney; and that, to defraud the. plaintiff, the de-
cedent had conveyed the land to another; and asking that the estate of
the decedent pay to the plaintiff the value of the land, less the amount
due from the plaintiff to the decedent on account of such liabilities and
Ices. The administrator answered that the cause of action did not
accrue within six years next before the commencement of the action,
and, also, that more than eighteen months elapsed after the death of the
decedent before the action was commenced. Held, on demurrer to the
answer, that whether the action was for relief against fraud, or to re-
cover money, the answer was good: Wallace v. Aletzker, 41 Ind.
MORTOAGE. See Bankriptcy.
Use ry-P, tyent of Premium to iduce Asqnee to pi)rChAse- Wh7o
may set zp Usntry.-A mortgage free from usury in the hands of the
mortgagee, is not rendered usurious by the payment of a premium to
the assignee to induce him to purchase it: Conover v. Hobart, 9 0. E.
Green.
But even if the mortgage were usurious, the purchaser of the mort-
gaged premises who has taken a conveyance from the mortgagor expressly
subject thereto, cannot set up usury as a defence to a suit on the mort-
gage : Id.
The purchaser of a mere equity of redemption in premises covered
by a usurious mortgage, who buys subject to the lien of such mortgage,
cannot set up usury as a defence to the encumbrance: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
V r-n'ges-Buildngs in ,Citles-Care in Construction of Cldmneys,
Flirnaca, etc.-Actiou for the destruction by fire of the plaintiff's fiac-
tory building, caused by sparks from the brewery of defendant. The
grounds on which a recovery was claimed were, first, that the flues,
chimneys, and furnaces in defendant's brewery, being near to plaintiff's
lactory building, were not built in proper shape, or of sufficient height
or capacity, thereby causing burning coals, soot, cinders, sparks, and
embers to be carried therefrom upon the roof of the factory, whereby
it was burned and destroyed; and, second, that defendant was negligent
in the use of the furnaces, flues, and chimneys, by making large fires
therein, of highly inflammable and dangerous material, so that the sparks,
embers, etc., passed from the chimney to the roof of the factory, burn-
ing and destroying it : Gagg v. Vetter, 41 mId.
The defendant's brewery was built in a populous part of a large and
rapidly increasing city. The property of the plaintiff, which was de-
stroyed by the fire, was there at the time the brewery was constructed:
Iel, that this imposed upon the defendant the necessity of exercis-
ing a higher degree of care and diligence in the construction and man-
agement of his brewery than if it had been located in the country. or
in a part of the city where there were no houses in its immediate
vicinity; that a mere difference of opinion among men of science and
experience, as to the best plan to construct the chimney, furnace, and
flues, did not justify the selection of any well supported theory without
further inquiry; for the defendant was bound to use all due care and
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vigilance to ascertain which theory was correct, and which incorrect;
and for that purpose lie was bound to avail himself of all the discoveries
which science and experience had put within his reach ; that while the
law does not require absolute scientific perfection in the construction of
such works, it does require the exercise of a high degree of care and
skill to ascertain, as nearly as may be, the best plan for such structures;
and it requires that not only skilful and experienced worknien shall be
employed in their construction, but that due skill shall be exercised by
such workmen in the particular instance; that the defendant was liable
in damages to the extent of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, if it
was proved upon the trial, either that ordinary care and diligence were
not employed in the construction of the chimney, furnaces, and flues, or
that lie was guilty of negligence in the management thereof, and that
the factory building was destroyed from either of these causes: I.
Tie question of negligence is one of mingled law and fact,. to be
decided as a question of law by the court, when the facts are undisputed
or conclusively proved, but not to be withdrawn from the jury when the
facts are disputed and the evidence is conflicting: Id.
It was proper for the court, in said action, to admit evidence to prove
that smoke, sparks, and flame had been seen coming out of the top of
tile chimney at other times than on the occasion of the injury complained
of, and to instruct the jury that it was proper for them to consider and
weigh such evidence, in determining whether the chiney and smoke-
stack had been properly constructed : d.
NUISANCE.
.2Vuis'nce to Dwellfrg--ho ses-Iiljmwction--S nolc from a Factory-
Offeunsive Odors-Noxous Vapors.-A court of equity will interpose by
injunction to restrain an existing or threatened nuisance to a dwelling-
house, if the injury be shown to be of such a character as to diminish
materially the value of the property as a dwelling, and seriously inter-
t'ere with the ordinary comfort and enjoyment of it; and if it appear
to Ie a case where subtantial damages could be recovered at law : Adams
v. Michael, 38 Md.
If a party erect a manufacturing establishment in immediate proximity
to the dwellings of his neighbors, and in its operation large volumes of
smoke, offensive odors and noxious vapors are emitted, thereby materially
interfering with tile comfort of the occupants of the dwellings, a court
of equity will interpose by injunction to restrain the continuance of the
nuisance: Id.
The appellants filed their bill for an injunction to restrain the appellee
from erecting a factory for the manufacture of felt roofing, in the im-
mediate vicinity of certain valuable dwelling-houses, the property of the
complainants, which factory, if allowed to be erected and put into oper-
ation, would, it was charged, become a nuisance specially injurious to
the complainants. The bill alleged that owing to the dirt, odor, smoke
and appurtenances of the factory, together with the inflammable nature
of tihe material used in tie manufacture of felt roofing, the property of
the complainants would be utterly destroyed as dwellings, and, that one
of the complainants would be deprived of the comforts of his home,
and the heahh of his family would be impaired by tile nuisance. The
bill fiurther alleged that the irreparable and continuing injury to the
complainant's property, and the value thereof, and to their just enjoy-
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ment of the same, would result from the erection and carrying on of the
said manufacturing business. hld: That the allegations of tie bill
were not sufficiently specific and definite as to the facts and circumstances
from which the court alone could determine whether the nuisance would
be of the nature and character supposed-the simple allegation that
particular consequences would follow the erection of the fictory, was
not sufficient; facts should have been stated so that the court could see
and determine whether the factory when erected, would or would not
constitute a nuisance such as would sensibly and materially diminish the
value of the complainants' property and the ordinary comfort and en-
joyment of it. That the bill thus failing to disclosd all the facts essen-
tial to enable the court to form an opinion as to the propriety of granting
an injunction, the application must be refused, but without prejudice
to any new application the complainants might think themselves entitled
to make : d.
PARTITION.
Denial of Pbdznti's title-Equity will not try Questions which can be
settled at Law.-In a suit for partition, a court of equity will not try the
question of illegitimacy on which the complainant's title is alleged to
depend, nor direct an issue to be framed that it may be tried at law
Riverview Cemeteiy Conpany v. Turner, 9 0. E. Green.
If in a suit for partition, the complainant's title is denied, and the
title nOhich is disputed is a legal one, the court may dismiss the bill, or
it may ecx gratia retain the cause to afford the complainant an oppor-
tunity to setde his title at law. It will not do more : Id.
RAILROAD.
TLjury to Animals.-To render a railroad liable, bnder the statute, for
animals killed or injured by its cars, locomotives, or other carriages,
there must be actual collision of the cars, locomotives, or other carriages
with such animals : 0. & ff. Railway Co. v. Cole, 41 Ind.
A railroad company is not liable, under the statute, for an injury to
an animal, where a train caused the animal to take fright, and the injury
was the result of the fright. Thus, the company is not liable, where a
colt, frightened by a train, ran front an adjoining field upon the railroad
track, which was not properly fenced, and there broke its leg between
the bars of a cow-pit: Id.
SALE. See Execution.
SHERIFF.
Poundage -An attorney issuing an execution, is liable to the sheriff
for his poundage thereon : Campbell v. (ollison, 65 Barb.
But when a judgment has been reduced in amount by the court on
appeal, even after levy made upon an execution issued on it, the
sheriff is entitled to his fees or poundage only on the amount to which
the judigment has been reduced; where he has been notified of such
reduction, and has collected only the reduced amount: Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE.
Inadequacy of Price-Mistake of Owner-Interference of Equity to
set aside.-A sheriff's sale will be set aside where there is gross inade-
quacy of price, and the party whose interest is injuriously affected by
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the sale has been prevented by mistake or misapprehension from at-
tending it : JMetzlcr v. Shaumann, 9 C. E. Green.
When property is sold under the process of this court for a grossly
inadequate price, the court will not permit one who, however, innocently
and unintentionally contributes to the mistake of the owner, by which
lie is misled as to the time of sale, to take advantage of the mistake by
a voluntary purchase of the property at the sale : Id.
SURETY.
Obliqat ion qf a Creditor to preserve the Securities held by1 him, for a
Dbt, for the benefit of the Surety-Debtor and Creditor-Conduct Iy
a Creditor in relation to the Securities he holdsfor the Debt, that does
vot discharge the Surety.-A surety, upon satisfying the debt for which
lie is bound, is entitled to the benefit of all securities, either of a legal
or an equitable nature, which the creditor has, or could have enforced
against the principal debtor and those claiming under him. The cred-
itor is bound to preserve all such securities for the benefit and protection
of the surety ; and if he parts with any of them, or if the benefit of
"thenm be lost by his act, the surety will be exonerated to the extent t)
which lie is prejudiced by the act of the creditor. And this right of
the surety is the same, although lie may not have known of the existence
of the securities held by the creditor, or though taken subsequently to
the date of the contract of suretyship: Freaner v. Yingling, 38 Md.
A creditor cannot be compelled to resort in the first instance to the
principal debtor, or to the securities which he holds for the debt, before
proceeding against the surety; nor is there any positive duty incumbent
on the creditor to prosecute measures of active diligence; mere deby
on his part, in the absence of some special equity, unaccompanied by
any valid contract for such delay, will not amount to laches, so as to
discharge the surety : Id.
TRESPASS.
l77 ild damnage to Property- umnr to third persons thercly.-If one
commits a wilfftl and malicious trespass upon the property of another,
under circumstances involving unavoidable injury to persons and pro-
perty, lie is responsible to any person injured by such tresp-isq. It is
not necessary that he should intend to do the particular injury which
ensues : Tauger v. Baker, 65 Barb.
Tile defendant, secretly, and with the wanton and malicious purpose
to injure and destroy the property of a railroad ermpany, and obstrnct
the running of trains upon its road, pulled out and threw aw:ay the pins
used in coupling together the cars of a train, whereby the ears were un-
cmpled, and the plaintiff, an empl)yee of the company, was injured.
I1eld, That such act being unlawful and obviously designed for mis-
chief, and involving naturally, if not necessarily, just such consequences
as did ensue, the defbndant was liable to the plaintiff for the injuries
sustained by him : Id.
Injunction to restrabin-dverse Possession by Fence-lilne -In a suit
for an injunction by one of two adjacent, landowners to rctrain the
other from erecting a building on lands of the fbrmer, the complainant
is entitled to the benefit of an actual location by fence erected more
than twenty-five years since, and up to which he and those under whom
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT IECISIONS.
lie claims, have been in continued pn:ssesion duri,,g all thait time
outhmayd et al. v. McLaughlin, 9 0. E. Green.
In such case, the defendant who had completed excavations on com-
plainant's land, will be restrained from further trespass until he shall
have established his right at law: Pi.
TRUSTEE.
Purchase at his ozon Sale-Presumption, of Fraud-La)se of Time
-Upon principles of public policy, trustees are not allowed to purchase
the trust property from the cestuds quo trust, or acquire rights therein
which may bring their personal interests in conflict with their official
duties: Pairo v. Vickery, 38 Md.
While transactions between trustees and cestuls quo trust are not void,
they are discountenanced by Courts of Equity; the presumption is
against their validity; and they are never upheld unless it clearly ap-
pear that they are free from all taint of unfairness. The onus of show-
ing their perfect bona fides is upon the trustee : L.
Lapse of time, where it has been long and is unexplained, and death
of parties, are sometimes ground for refusing relief, especially where in
the mean time, other parties have acquired rights, or there are other
circumstances from which the court can see that injustice might be
done by interference ; but in questions of this kind each case must de-
pend upon its own circumstances : I1.
UsuRy. See Mortgage.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
False Representations-Dity of .Purchaser,-A representation, made
by a vendor, respecting the property sold, may relieve the purchaser
from the use of that care, caution and observation that he would be
bound to exercise if no representation were made: Vandewatcer v.
Osmier, 65 Barb.
While it is true that a purchaser may, by relying on the representa-
tions of the vendor, be misled, and omit to make that careful examina-
tion of the property that a prudent man would and should make, yet a
jury should require the clearest proof that the purchaser was induced
by the representation, to omit to examine the property: Pd.
It will not do to permit a vendee, having tie property before him and
defects in it plainly discoverable, to shut his eyes and ears, and omit to
use his senses, and pretend that he relied on the representations, an'd
was thereby misled: Id.
In cases of warranty, an obvious defect is not cured by the warranty;
because the law requires the purchaser to examine the property with
that degree of care and skill that men generally are capable of exercising,
in respect to property they are proposing to purchase. The same
principle should apply in cases of false representation. If the property
is not present, the purchaser may rely on the representation, but if the
property is present, and nothing is said or done by the vendor to induce
the purchaser not to examine it, and the falsity of the representation is
palpable to the senses, the purchaser cannot be permitted to omit ex-
amination, and justify his omission by the representation: Id.
VOLUNTARY PAYME NT. See Action.
